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ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS ON THE TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS
By Margo Schlanger, Margaret Colgate Love, and Carl Reynolds
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years, corrections
treatment
than 10concerned
about theprofessionor more
als
and other-s
of prisoners have despaired over conditions in
California's prisons. Criowding, violence, racial segregation, abysmal medical care, an obstructionist corrections
union, and a state budgyet crisis have combined to bring
the system to the polint of constitutional meltdown. In
2008, a state appellate court found conditions of "extreme peril to the safety of persons and property," and
a three-judge federal court confirmed the existence of a
"substantial risk to the health and safety of the men and
women who work iniside these prisons and the inmates
housed in them." (See CCPOA v. Schwarzenegger, 77
Cal. Rptr. 3d 844,85 (Cal. App. Ct. 2008); Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 330960 (Feb. 9, 2009).)
California's situationi is extreme and atypical, but its
lessons have not been lost on other jurisdictions struggling to cope with gr-eatly, expanded prison populations
in a time of severe budget constraints. Nor have they
been lost on the legal profession.
In a 2003 speech to the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy noted the "remarkable scale" of incarceration in the United States, and challenged the bar
to address "the inadequacies-and the injustices-in
our prison and correctional systems." (See http://new.
abanet.org/sections/cr-iminaljustice/PublicDocuments/
Justice KennedySpeechi.pdf.) Responding to Justice
Kennedy's challenge, the ABA moved quickly to renew
its lung-standing commitment to the fair, effective, and
humane treatment of those who are imprisoned, initially
through establishing the Justice Kennedy Commission.
The following year, in 2004, it began the work of revising its standards governing the treatment of prisoners.
The goal was to provide up-to-date guidance addressing
current conditions and challenges in American jails and

prisons, with due respect for the extensive responsi bilit ieS
of correctional officials and the considerable constrints
under which they operate.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on the Trea,_tment of Prisoners, more than five years in themaig
wxere approved by the ABA House of Delegates ini February 2010. The new Standards are part of the ABA's
multivolume Criminal Justice Standards project that
has shaped the development of law and practice in the
American criminal justice system since the 1960s. They
replace the 1981 Standards on the Legal Status of Prisoners, which proved a useful source of insight and gTuidance for courts and correctional administrators during
the 1980s, but had become sadly outdated and incomplete. Enormous changes have affected Americani corrections since 1981, and this revision is long overdue.
The Treatment of Prisoners Standards apply to all
prisoners in adult correctional facilities, including jails,
and cover a range of topics from classification and
conditions of confinement to health care and access to
courts. They address many topics of current concern not
covered by the 1981 Standards, such as long-term and
extreme isolation, privatization,) reentry, and external
oversight. Grounded in legal and constitutional principles, they aspire to promote the safe and efficient operation of correctional facilities while protecting prisoners'
rights. (These Standards apply to all prisoners confined
in adult correctional and criminal detention facilities, regardless of age or immigration status, but do not seek
to cover facilities dedicated entirely to either juvenile or
immigration detention.)

The most consequential change since the ABA originally
adopted prisoner standards in 1981 is the astronomical
growth in incarceration in the United States. In 198 1,
557,000 prisoners were held in American jails and prisMARGO SCHLAGER is the officer frr civil rights and civil liberties ons; that number has since skyrocketed to 2.4 million
on any giv en day-two-thirds in prisons and one-third
fbr the US. Dcpartmnentof'Homeland Security. Prior to her
in jails. The population explosion has imposed severe
appointment to that position, She was reporterfor the Treatment
of Prisoners Standarstisriceinopoaewriting she, did pressure on correctional authorities as they attempt to
when she i ias reporter-, before her current government tenulre-, and cope with more people and longer terms of incarceration. N-\ew challenges have appeared and old ones have
neithecr it nor the StandardIs 1themiselves reflect the views of the
Depoartlment of Homeli-and S-cuirityV.NARGARET COLGATE LOVE7 expanded, among them crowding, health care responsiblte.Ad&the specialneedsJofVaitofpsne.
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justice supervision. The Pew Center on the States reported that, on any1given day, more than one in every
100 adults is beind bars, (see http://www.pewcenter
onthestates.org/niews room detail.aspx?id=359 12), and
one in every 31 is unider some sort of correctional control. Over the couLrse of a year, about 13 million people
spend time behind bars in our nation's jails and prisons. (See JOHN J. GiIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE BELLEvILLE
KATZENIBACH (CHAIRS), CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT: A
REPORT OF THE COMIMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN
AMERICA'S PRISONS 11 (VERA INSTITUTE, 2006).) WIhile

public safety is the paramount objective of the criminal
justice system, it cia and must be pursued with due regard to the dignity atnd humanity of the confined.
As the landscape h,'ias been transformed by time and
increased population over the past decades, relevant law
has also changed considerably. Statutory and decisional
law has in some ways expanded, in others contracted, the
scope of legal protection for prisoners. International human rights standards have likewise evolved substantially,
more uniformly in favor of prisoners' rights. New approaches in corrections have elicited new legal standards
and rules; new approaches to a variety of legal questions
have varied in their application to corrections;, and the
application of the Eighth Amendment, the "basic concept underlying [which] is nothing less than the dignity
of man," has continued to safeguard "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." (Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).)
In light of all these changes since 1981, this new version of the ABA Standards takes a new look at American
prisons and jails, and sets out practical guidelines to help
those concerned about what happens behind bars. In large
part, the Standards state the law, with sources from the
Constitution, federal statutes and regulations, and court
decisions developing each. They also rely on other legal
sources, such as settlements negotiated between the U.S.
Department of Justice and state and local governments
under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1997 et seq, as well as non-DOJ consent
decrees, as model1s for imi-plementation of legal norms.
in addition, there are occasions in which the litigation-developed conistitutional minima for prisoners'
rights and their remediaiion omit critical issues that are
ofcnentrmiarutc
oic
aesadcr
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in litigation, some infrastructure is recognized in some
circumstances as a constitutional obligation of aninIIcarcerating

authority.

Supervisory

failures

fa"diure

to screen, failure to train, failure to supervise, failurev
to discipline-can all cause the violation of prisoner-is'
rights, though they do not constitute such a violation.
Accordingly, while the Supreme Court has underscoredc
that supervisory liability is the exception rather tha the
ti
rule, such failures can be a predicate for damages liaibIIty'P
and an object of a mandatory injunction. (See, e.g., Bd.
of Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
4 12-13 (1997) (failure to screen); City of Canton, Ohiio v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989) (failure to train).)
It is important to note, however, that the Standartids
go beyond these limited precedents for a second reason:
The Standards can appropriately be less deferential to
prison administrators than are courts adjudicating con.stitutional claims, because the Standards offer advice not
only to courts-which grant correctional administrators
a good deal of deference in order to respect the principle
of separation of powers-but to the political branchies.
As the Supreme Court explained in Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 349 (1996):
It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it
is not the role of courts, but that of the political
branches, to shape the institutions of government
in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the
Constitution.
The Standards' role is not to provide a restatement
of the litigated constitutional law of corrections, guided
as that lawx is by this principle of deference. Rather, the
Standards have as their very purpose-most prominently
in their provisions related to oversight and private prisons, but elsewhere as well-"to shape the institutions of
government in such fashion as to comply with the laws
and the Constitution."
The organized bar 1has played and should c/--ontinue to
play a crucial role in Ameri'can corrections. Prisons and
jail
ar, to their-core,-leaIstItuion.Teioulto

broader community, Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941);
and litigation that first emphasized the relevance of the
rule of law to prison administration, Cooper v. Pate, 378
U.S. 546 (1964). Litigation pushed corrections down the
path of accreditation itself.
Moreover, members of the bar have substantial exper
tise in this area. As lawyers and judges, they are in daily
contact with the criminal justice system. ABA members
represent clients facing possible imprisonment or pris
oners challenging the conditions of their confinement.
They also represent prisons and jails in litigation, and
counsel those institutions on legal compliance. Members
of the organized bar spearheaded the nation's response
to the deadly 1971 riot at New York's Attica prison and
then went on to formulate the terms of a more general
commitment to the rule of law within prisons. Robert
McKay, dean of the NYU Law School, was the chair of
the Attica Commission and the ABA Commission on
Correctional Facilities and Services, the initiative formed
in response to Chief Justice Warren Burger's 1969 call to
the bar to focus its concern and abilities on the adminis
tration of the nation's correctional systems.
Yet the bar's role in corrections has often been con
tested, even opposed. After a tentative draft of Chapter
23 was completed in 1977, it was extensively debated in
the ABA House of Delegates in August 1978 for precise
ly that reason, and was not approved until after a joint
ABA/ACA task force, assisted by an arbitrator, submit
ted a revised version of Chapter 23 four years later. As
passed, Chapter 23 dealt extensively with matters also
the subject of the ACA standards, and it imposed more
than a few limits on administrator discretion that were
more stringent than the ACXs approach. This moment
in the ABXs history marked its considered commitment
to the paired propositions that 1) the bar cannot cede to
corrections professionals the task of improving Ameri
can conditions of confinement, and 2) the bar's contri
bution to corrections should take account of but not be
bound by the views of corrections professionals.
A third principle emerges from even these brief de
scriptions: 3) the bar's prescriptions for corrections
exceed constitutional minima. The ABA has taken a
consistent stance that it is the bar's proper province not
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merely to restate the operational floor established by
courts and legislatures but rather to promote the fair
and humane operation of the criminal justice institu
tions that are prisons and jails. Because the Standards
are intended to provide guidance to judges, policy mak
ers, lawyers, and correctional administrators, and to
shape the just and lawful operation of the criminal jus
tice system, some Standards are aspirational, yet within
the bounds of lawful and feasible correctional practice.
Each and every one of these Standards reflects the best
current thinking on the correctional practices necessary
to protect prisoner's rights and operate safe, humane,
and effective prisons.
That said, the Standards leave a large place for the op
erational expertise of corrections professionals, a num
ber of whom were intimately involved in the drafting of
the revised Standards. The Standards are aimed at estab
lishing the conditions that should exist in confinement
facilities. How these conditions are made operational has
been left to the skill and resourcefulness of correctional
administrators. For example, adequate light in housing
areas is necessary for humane operation of a prison,
as stated in both the 1981 Standards (23-6.13(c)(ii))
and the 2010 Standards (23-3.l(a)(v)). But translation of
this general command into a specific measure of "foot
candles" in different settings is beyond the comparative
advantage and appropriate role of the bar.

The Law of Prisons

Prisoners' rights and interests are protected under the
Eighth Amendment, whose cruel and unusual punish
ments clause enforces "contemporary standards of de
cency" for convicted prisoners, Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But of course, rights of prisoners
are subject to restrictions and limitations "justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system." (Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334
U.S. 266, 285 (1948)); a prisoner "simply does not pos
sess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated indi
vidual an important tension must be navigated. In tension
with this reality of restricted liberty is the relatively mod
ern recognition that "There is no iron curtain drawn be
tween the Constitution and the prisons of this country."
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(Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).)
In Turner i Saifley,, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), the Court
held that "when a,-prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."
Under the Eighth Amendment some rights-rights related to protection friom harm, in particular-are broader in prison than outside. But Turner makes it clear that
the scope of many other rights shrinks behind the prison
walls. Chief among these highly limited rights are privacy, free speech, anid association. Even under Turner',
however, prison regulations are unconstitutional if they
reflect an "exaggerated response"! even to real security
concerns. Turner itself overturned a prison rule against
prisoner marriages on this basis. The approach of these
Standards is to offer- a referent useful for those administrators seeking to avoid such an exaggerated response,
and for courts seeking to assess correctional practices in
application of this test.

needed, and a written statement of reasons for the decisionl
have frequently been required.
The Supreme Court has always been careful niot to
require due process protections around every important
decision affecting prisoners' lives. Decisions relatinga to
classification and interprison transfers, for exampl,hav
beeni held not to deprive prisoners of a protected libe10rt 'y
interest, and therefore the due process clause does not
re.ach them. (See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (19716)
(classification, in dicta); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976) (interprison transfers); Ohim v. Wakinekona-, 461
U.S. 238 (1983) (interstate prison transfers).) The samec
is true for decisions relating to various privileges. (See;
Sandin v. Conner; 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (noting this reCsult for shock incarceration, tray lunches rather than box
lunches, and in-cell television).) Moreover, in Sanidin, the
Supreme Court introduced a significant restriction on prisoners' rights in this area when it ruled that a liberty interest,
and thus the need for due process, is not implicated in a

d due process
The Supreme Court h, s not req
prot,,:ction around every decision affectiong pnsoners
An additional key strand of the constitutional law
of corrections involves prisoners' procedural rightsin particular, the process due for further deprivations
of liberty within the prison or jail setting. The Supreme
Court has insisted on various procedural protections to
ensure accurate and fair decision making in such contexts as prison discipline involving deprivation of goodtime credits, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974);
transfer to a psychiatric institution, Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480 (1980); and forced administration of psychotropic medication., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990). Those precedents remain good law: Contemporary case law is clear that substantial process continues
to be due in proceedings to further deprive prisoners of
their liberty. Were a liberty interest is found, the question these cases answer is w.Nhat process is due. Under the
established general analysis, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976),, the answer has Nvaried based on the gravity of the liberty interest, the value of the process sought
and the risk of erroneous deprivations if it is omitted,
and the burden the process would impose. In the prison
setting, this has meant that the law does not require the
full panoply of due process protections familiar from
criminal trials. But noticeC, (a-n opportunity to be heard
before a decision ma'ker who had no involve-1-ment in,the
relevant events, a limi-ted right to assistance where it is
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prison disciplinary case unless the disciplinary penalty
imiposes an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."
(Id. at 484.) Thus discipline that does not impact the
length of a prisoner's incarceration but only its conditions is often not regulated by the due process clause; if
similar conditions are sometimes imposed not as a matter of discipline but for administrative reasons, they are
not deemed "atypical." Especially in states and settings
in which prison life is particularly stark, this test, from
Sanldin, shrinks the liberty interests protected.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which drastically transformed the
rutles governing litigation by prisoners. The statute had
twvo goals: to stem wvhat Congress saw, as a tide of frequenttly frivolous lawsuits by prisoners, and to rein in
wha~it Congress saw, as unduly intrusive court orders in
prison and jail class actions. (See Margo Schlang-er; Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. Riv. 1555 (2003); Margo
Schlanger; Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time.- A Case
Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.YU. L. RiEv.
550 (2006).) With respect to the first goal, it is clearly
the case that pro se prisoner lawvsuits in federal court are
numerous, often lack legyal merit, and pose real management chiallenges both for courts and for correctional
authorities. Thfe PLRA's supporters focused on these
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problems, but emphasized over and over: "[We] do not
want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims.
This legislation will niot prev ent those claims from being
raised. The legislation xxwill, however, go far in preventing
inmates from abusing the Federal judicial system." (141
CONG. RiEc. S 14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Hatch).)
Unfortunately, the results have not fulfilled this sanguine prediction. Thle PLRA has been extremely effective
in shrinking the num-ber of federal lawsuits by prisoners,
even as incarcerated populations rise; since its passage,
prisoners' federal filing rates have declined 60 percent,
from 26 federal cases per thousand prisoners in 1995 to
fewer than 11Icases per thousand prisoners in 2006. And
the burden posed by, litigation for prison and jail officials has diminished even more, because of the statute's
screening provisions, which require courts to dispose
of legally insufficient prisoner civ il rights cases (as well
as some cases brouight by nonprisoners), often without
even notifying the sued officials of the suit against them
and without receiving aL'ny response from those officials.
Under the PLRA, Prison or jail officials no longer need
to investigate or answxer complaints that are frivolous or
fail to state a claim under federal law.
But the dramatic reduction in the volume of prisoner
litigation has by no means been limited to the frivolous or
even nonmeritorious cases. If the PLRA were successfully
"reduc[ing] the quantity and improv[ing] the quality of
prisoner suits," Porter v. Nuss.le, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002),
as its supporters intended, one would expect the dramatic
decline in filings to be accompanied by a concomitant increase in plaintiffs' success rates in the cases that remain.
The evidence is quite the contrary. The shrunken prisoner
docket is less successful than before the PLRA's enactment; more cases are dismissed, and fewer settle. (See
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra, at 1644-64.)
That result is not surprising: Many aspects of the
PLRA undermine court access even for prisoners with
meritorious cases., or are unfair for other reasons. Congress is currently considering amending the statute, and
the ABA-endorsed reform several years ago. (See ABA
resolution 102B, 2007 Midyear Meeting (Prison Litigation Reform Act).) Several provisions of two Standards
restate the ABA's positions on these issues:

RIMS

AL JUSThC

bring a lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Standard 2-39.2(d) requires, instead, that lawsuits be staye d 1fo-r
several months if that time is needed for ,Acomplaint to be processed through a grievance sy\1st emi
and then be allowed to proceed in court.
*The PLRA bars damages for "mental or emno t Ion)I
al injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e);
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2). Standard 23-9.3(c) recomnmends that there should be no such bar.
* The PLRA limits the equitable authority of
courts in prisoner litigation in a variety ofwas
18 U.S.C. § 3626. Standard 23-9.3(d) insists that
courts should have the same equitable authority
in conditions of confinement cases as in other
civil rights cases.
* The PLRA drastically limits the availability of attorneys fees in successful prisoner civil rights cases,
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d); altering the ordinary feeshifting rules, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Standard 23-9.4(f)
requires that prisoner's litigation not be singled out
in this way.
In short, the PLRA places formidable, indeed often
insurmountable, obstacles in the path of prisoners when
they seek redress from the courts for violations of their
federally secured rights, leaving a wide range of constitutional violations beyond judicial remedy Standards 23-9.2
and 23-9.3 affirm the ABA's core principles of due process
and equality, by requiring that effective and fair procedures for redress be available to prisoners as they are for
others who seek the protections of the legal system.
The same year the PLRA was passed, the Supreme
Court decided Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996),
which is also pertinent to a number of the Standards.
Two decades prior to Lewis, in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817 (1977), the Supreme Court held that prison officials
must not merely refrain from posing obstacles to prisoners' access to the courts, such as the refusal to forward
a court petition held unconstitutional in Ex Panre Hull,
312 U.S. 546 (1941), but actually offer affirmative assistance', usually by providing a law library. Lewis overruled Bounds in part, holding that prisoners' court access
rights are limited to criminlal and constitutional cases.
MoevrAei
mpaieIhtpisnr
setn
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inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even
to file a complaint." (Id. at 351.)
Lewis sets the conistitutional minima, but if officials
prov ide only that muLch, they restrict prisoners' access to
courts far more than is appropriate. After all, prisoners
have many legal needs unrelated to either unconstitutional conditions or the fact of their confinement-they
face legal proceedingis relating to their families, immigration issues, statutory rights, etc. It is both unduly harsh
and not conducive to accurate outcomes in those consequential cases to exempt them from court access rights.
Accordingly, these Standards are not limited to criminal,
habeas, and constitutional litigation.
The Standards likewise do not condition the various
components of couirt access rights on a showing that a
prisoner has suffered a concrete injury brought about
by the failure to provide access or other assistance. But
while this exceeds Lewis's holding that litigated remediation of a violation of court access rights requires a showing of "actual injury," it does not reject Lewis's analy sis.

grievance systems under the Prison Litigation efr
Act; the content if not the organization is very sim ilar
to the 1981 predecessors. Part X, on "Administr-ation
and Staffing," deals with issues relating to staff t raIning1
and accountability (a prerequisite for enforcement of'
legal rights) and with private prisons. Finally, Part X1,
"Accountability and Oversight," addresses bothintra
and kexternal oversight mechanisms, including the meidli.
Scope. The Standards apply to all adult correctional
and criminal detention facilities, including jails. They,
also apply to all those confined in such institutions, inIcluding immigration detainees, juveniles, and pretrial
detainees, for whom the legal protections due a reIfifany thing greater. Separate juvenile facilities or separate imigration detention facilities are not covered becaulseof
substantial differences in law and policy consideraions.
(The ABA was a partner in developing the Immigrationl
and Customs Enforcement Detention Staindards, and
even plays a role in monitoring compliance with thiem.
See http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigr-ationi/
detention-standards. shtml; Report No. 11I lB, Aug. 2008.).
Note that the definition of a correctional facility
Organization. Part I, "General Principles," provides includes even very small facilities, of which there are
overarching purposes and principles. Part 11 covers the many. At last count, about half the nation's 3,000 ja1ils
initial decisions abouit each prisoner admitted to a cor- (excluding lockups) housed fewer than 50 prisoners on
rectional facility intake and classification (the process an average day. Those Standards that require particular
by which correctional agencies decide on appropriate bureaucratic structures in order to facilitate humanl~e and
housing, custody, and programming for prisoners), and constitutional treatment of prisoners-for example, sevreclassification decisions including segregation and ex- eral layers of review of agency operations-may need
treme isolation. Part III addresses "Conditions of Con- adaptation for such small facilities. But most of the Stanfinement," describing both what must be provided (e.g., dards that present compliance challenges for small fafood., light, clothing) and what may not be taken away cilities-for example, the requirements of mental health
(e.g., opportunity for out-of-cell exercise, sleep). Part IV monitoring for prisoners in segregated housing-are recovers "Rules of Conduct and Discipline." Part V, on quired for prisoner safety no less in a small than a large
"Personal Security,") treats protection from harm issues facility. If a small facility finds itself unable to comply
(including sexual assault and other prisoner-on-prisoner
with such mandates, it should seek out some cooperative
violence, and protection of particularly vulnerable pris- arrangement with a larger facility that has developed the
oners), as well as use of force. Part VI deals with another required operational expertise and capacity.
area of affirmative obligation, "Health Care" (a term deSimilarly, the definition of the term 'jail" covers temfined to cover medical, mental health, and dental care).
porary holding or lockup facilities, from which prisoners
Part VII, on "Personal Dignity," is probably the part are usually transferred wTithin 72 hours and not held bemost directly reliant on the 1981 Standards, addingY only yond arraignment. As with small jails, complete complian additional standard relating -to "cross-gender superv,i- ance with these Standards by such facilities cannot be
sion," an issue less salient in 1981 than niow. Because of expected. Simply because of prisoners' short lengthi of
thel
new4emphasis n ciialjsie
oiy o issues o--f stay, smeo tr-,he StandC A-r areentrel nappliable for
"renr"
acltaig herinegaio7f hoelev
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should apply in full fo rce (for example, Standards on use
of force and use of restraints). Rather than entirely excluding lockup facilities from coverage, or devoting substantial space in the SLtndards to the issues involved, it is
our intent to recomnad to those who operate lockups
that they use these Standards as guidance for their operations and comply wvith as many of the Standards as
practicable and sensible in light of the unique needs and
challenges lockups present.
The definition of the word "staff" is important in
light of the many types of employees working in prisons and jails. Within a secure facility, private contractors
(e.g., employees of a Private health care contractor) or
noncorrectional governiment employees (e.g., teachers or
public health official.;s) are just as much state actors as
the security and nonisecurity staff who work more directly for correctional agencies, and it is important to make
it clear that they are equally bound by operative norms.
Highlights. One imiportant substantive commitment that
runs through the Stanidards is an insistence that prisons be
safe, but that, simultaneously, restrictions upon prisoners
should be justified rathier than reflexive. A second commitment of the Standards, detailed in the Part IX, is that
independent monitoring of correctional facilities is preservative of prisoners' substantive rights and is equally necessary for both private and public facilities. Transparency and
accountability are difficult challenges in closed institutions
such as prisons, but without them rights cannot be assured.
In addition to these themes, the Standards take on three
key issues of modemn American correctional experience:
crowding, long-term segregation, and reentry.
Crowding
As discussed above, the most important trend in American corrections for the past 30 years has been population
growth. The result of growth is not inevitably crowding;
space and resources may-and sometimes have-kept
pace with increasing populations. But particular jurisdictions have indisputably housed more prisoners than

they were prepared for, and this crowding affects -notjuist
sleeping arrangements (although requiring prisoners to
sleep on mattresses on the floor is a common and very
problematic response to crowding, and has been hfeldl
unconstitutional). As the courts have found recently in
systemic California prison litigation, crowding can uindermine medical care, security, and virtually all atspects
of conditions of confinement.
lat
A three-judge district court in California fouth
crowding in the California prison system was the primary cause of that system's currently unconstitutionailly
deficient medical and mental health care. (Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 2430820 (E.D. Cal., 2009).)
The district court set out a case study of the problemnatic
impact of egregious crowding, describing the "everyday\,
threat to [prisoner] health and safety" caused by ""the uinprecedented overcrowding of California's prisons." (Id.
at * 1.) The court elaborated:
Since reaching an all-time population record of
more than 160,000 in October 2006, the state's
adult prison institutions have operated at almost
double their intended capacity As Governor
Schwarzenegger observed in declaring a prison
state of emergency that continues to this day, this
creates "conditions of extreme peril" thait threaten
"the health and safety of the men and women who
work inside [severely overcrowded] prisons and the
inmates housed in them. .. ." Ex. P1 at 1, 8. Thousands of prisoners are assigned to "bad beds," such
as triple-bunked beds placed in gymnasiums or
day rooms, and some institutions have populations
approaching 30000 of their intended capacity. In
these overcrowded conditions, inmate-on-inmate
violence is almost impossible to prevent, infectious
diseases spread more easily, and lockdowns are
sometimes the only means by which to maintain
control. In short, California's prisons are bursting
at the seams and are impossible to manage.
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Crowding can be partially addressed by correctional
officials; they ca imkiprove efficiency and develop various
coping strategies. But they do not control most of the
policy levers that ight relieve crowding (chiefly their
budgets and the miechanisms that control the entry and
exit of prisoners) anid accordingly the Standard (23-3.1)
is addressed not just to correctional agencies, but more
broadly to federalI, state, and local authorities of all types
wxho can cause or solve a crowding problem.
The definition of crowding in corrections policy is
somewhat controver-sial; disputes occur about whether a
facility is crowded when its population exceeds "design
capacity," "operatonal capacity," or "rated capacity"
Standard 23-3.1 provides two definitions. One is entirely
inimalist), looking to adverse imfunctional (and vr
pact. Like the Supreme Court's test for evaluating the
constitutionality of "double-celling" in Rhodes v. Chapman, the Standard's reference to "crowding that ... adversely affects the facility's delivery of core services at
an adequate level, maintenance of its physical plant, or
protection of prisoners from harm, including the spread

have grown much more rare, both because of the Su premen
Court's insistence in Rhiodes that crowding is not itself aconstitutional violation and because of the provi*1sio ns of1
the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act, in wich Congress made it extremely difficult for civil rights plaintliffs
to obtain population caps. (See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3))
The Standards do not suggest any use of population caps
to relieve crowding, rather urging authorities to avoidth
problem using whatever method they choose. It seems aid visable that where crowding exists, it should trigger ,Are
view of options for housing prisoners in other corrTection1al settings or in the community, as well as an exaim~ition
of the policies and processes that resulted in crowding.
Part X of the Standards does frown upon onie comi-mon response to population pressure: privatization. The%1
1980s and I1990s saw enormous growth in use of priva"tec
prison companies, which now operate a very significanti
proportion of correctional facilities in the United States.
According to its Web site, the largest private prison corporation, CCA, operates 60 facilities with over 80,000
beds-which makes it, alone, responsible for more

Some observers of pnvate prisons believe strongiy th:.:,Jt
0
0
imprisonment is a core governmental function,
of disease" takes as its touchstone the existence of an adverse impact on core services-those relating to prisoner
health and safety. (See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 348 (1981) (upholding double-celling where it "did
not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care,
or sanitation" and did nut "increase violence among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison
confinement"); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, at *32 ("A
prison system's capacity is not defined by square footage
alone; it is also determined by the system's resources and
its ability to provide inmates with essential services such
as food, air, cand temperature and noise control.").) In
addition, following thero American Correctional Association, crowding is also defined to mean population "that
exceds acorectionalI facility's rated capacity." (Rated
the ACA to mean "theC. origainal
capacity is defined b1-y
design capacity, plus or minus capacity changes resulting
from building additions, reductions, or revisions." ACA,
PRISON STANDARDS 4-4129.) This definition has the benefit of easy administration and the potential to change to
reflect changed circumstances.
During the 1980s, many court orders relieved crowd,]Jails and prison by imposing numerical
ing in individual
caps on the prison population1 permitted. Such orders
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prisoners than any state but California, Texas, and Florida.
(See Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Prison Inmates
at Midyear 2008 Statistical Tables, tbls. 2 and 11I(Bureau of Justice Statistics, June 2007), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.govlcontent/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf.)
Privatization promised cost savings and improved
performance, but there is now a question whether it has
delivered on those promises. (See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE

(1996).) And private facilities have been shown to h1ave.
disproportintyhigh rates of serious incidents involving prisoner safety.. (See Sharon Dolovich, State Puntishmient and Private Prisons, 55 DUiK L.J. 440, 504-07
(200.5).) At the same time, piatization does allo-w gov-

ernment greater flexibility as prison populations expand
and contract.
Some close observers of private prisons believe
strongly that imprisonment is a core governmental function that should not be deleg1:ate,,d to the private sector
and should not be a profit-making enterprise. Without
recommending a categorical ban on private prisons,
Standard 23-10.5 is founded on a high degree of discomfort with the idea of profitLable prisons, where-as In
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every type of humaniiceniterprise-money may gain priority over law, morality, atnd rights. Prison privatization can
create a financial inicentive system in which stockholders become richer wheni prisoners are fed less, housed in
smaller cells, or provided substandard health care, less
education, or fewer programs.
With these observations as motive, the standard spells
out precautions that protect both the prisoners and the
contracting jurisdiction. In 1990, the ABA House of
Delegates urged caution in the use of private correctional
facilities. (ABA resolution 115SB, 1990 Midy ear Meeting,
available at http://ww'"w.abanet.orglcrimjustlpolicy/cjpol.
html#my90ll1 b.) Standard 23-10.5 goes a bit farther,
suggesting that jurisdictions "should make every effort"
to avoid privatization-, in secure facilities, and that they
should enter into a:tpivatization contract for operation
of any correctional facility only if "it can be demonstrated that the contract will result either in improved performance or in substantial cost savings, considering both
routine and emergency costs, with no diminution in performance." (Cf Texas Government Code sec. 495.003(c)(4)
(authorizing private prison contracting only if the private entity can "offer a level and quality of programs at
least equal to those provided by state-operated facilities
that house similar types of inmates and at a cost that provides the state with a sa(:vings of not less than 10 percent
of the cost of housing inmates in similar facilities and
providing similar programs to those types of inmates in
state-operated facilities").)
In addition, like the 1990 ABA policy, which endorses
contract-related "Guidelines Concerning Privatization
of Prisons and Jails" this Standard spells out contractual
precautions that protect both the prisoners and the contracting jurisdiction. Even privatization's advocates urge
extremely careful and comprehensive contracting with
explicit terms governing substance, monitoring, penalties, and termination.

the modern supermax prison was not born until USP
Marion was locked down permanently in 1983, after thIe
murder of two correctional officers by prisoners on the
same day. The federal Bureau of Prisons opened another such facility in Florence, Colorado, in 1994;- by 1999,
more than 30 states operated supermax prisons. (Chase
Riveland, Stupernax Prisons.-Overview and General Considerations5, 1 (NIC 1999), available at http://www.nicic.
orglpubs/19991014937.pdf.) These freestanding facilities
hold thousands of prisoners, and have also made more
salient the issues raised by similar custody arrangements
in units within general population facilities.
To understand life in long-term segregation, consider,
for example, the Supreme Court's description of life in the
Ohio State Penitentiary, the supermax facility that was the
subject of Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005):
In the OSP almost every aspect of an inmate's life
is controlled and monitored. Inmates must remain
in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23
hours per day. A light remains on in the cell at all
times., though it is sometimes dimmed, and an inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is
subject to further discipline. During the one hour
per day that an inmate may leave his cell, access is
limited to one of two indoor recreation cells.
Incarceration at OSP is synonymous with extreme
isolation. In contrast to any other Ohio prison, including any segregation unit, OSP cells have solid
metal doors with metal strips along their sides and
bottoms which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals are taken alone in
the inmate's cell instead of in a common eating area.
Opportunities for visitation are rare and in all events
are conducted through glass walls. It is fair to say OSP
inmates are deprived of almost any environmental or
sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact.

Long-Term Segregation

The most secure classification status in prison is longterm solitary confinem-ent, sometimes in a facility or unit
labeled "supermax." Living conditions in this kind of
isolated setting are generally the same, whether it is conferred after a classification or other nondisciplinary prosegreati"

) Ana
r s isiin;fr--111-7 a serious 4,rle

n fration'

Some prisoners are sufficiently mentally resilient (or
their stays in segreg7ation sufficiently short) that isolating
confinement does them no lasting harm; for others, the
human cost can be devastating. Abundant research demonstrates that prisoners in segregation often experience
phsia-ad- etaI dtrir
tion.
Indeed, evenin0
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lently insane; otheirs, still, committed suicide; while
those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, aind in most cases did not recover
sufficient mental activity to he of any subsequent
service to the com-munity.
(In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). See also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1940) (referring
to "solitary confinement" as one of the techniques of
"rphysical and mental torture" governments hav e used to
coerce confessions).)
The modern evidence is abundant. As a leading
expert summarizes:

Solitary confinemaent-that is the confinement of a
prisoner alone in a cell for all, or nearly all, of the
day with minimal environmental stimulation and
minimal opportunity for social interaction-can
cause severe psychiatric harm. It has indeed long
been known that severe restriction of environmental and social stimulation has a profoundly deleterious effect on mental functioning.
(Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effe~cts of'Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 325 (2006).)
Some dangcerous prisoners pose a threat to others
unless they are physically separated. But such separation does not necessitate the social and sensory isolation that has become routine. Extreme isolation is not
about physical protection of prisoners from each other.
It is a method of deterrence and control-and as currently practiced it is a failure. The segregation units of
American prisons are full not of Hannibal Lecters but
of "the young, the pathetic, the mentally ill." (Rob Zaleski, Supermax Doesn't Reflect the Wisconsin That Walter Dickey Knows, CAPiTAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Aug.
27, 2001 (quoting Walter Dickey, former secretary of the
Wisconsin Departmient of Corrections).)
Long-term segregation units are extraordinarily expensive to build and operate. Too many prisoners are
hou sed in thnem for too long, in conditions whose harshness stem-s more fromn criminal justice politics than from
correctional necessity or even usefulness. Those prisoners experience extrem-e suffering within the units, and
thosewhA_
eseios enalilnes requenty-deco
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coniditions are inconsistent with the human digniity of'
Prisoners, as well as frequently being counterIprodutcti ve1.It is for this reason that the Standards req ireIVsev
eral important reforms in this area of criminal justice
policy-and the ABA is far from the first organization
to offer proposals along these lines. (See, e_g. REP~O R
of' Ti

E-1,COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND A-BUsE IN AMEiCA'Si

supra at 52-60.)
Most of the Standards deal generally with all assignmenits to segregated housing, regardless of the justificati on. Eight Standards, including four in Part 11 (23 -2.6 to
2.9) regulate administrative and disciplinary segregattion,1.
long''-and short-term. Standard 23-2.6 sets out veryl broa
substantive prerequisites for placing a prisoner in segregat
tiont even for a short time; Standard 3-.7prviesfa
narrowver rationales acceptable for segregation for a longer
period. Standard 23-2.8 deals with the extremely important topic of mental health monitoring of prisoners in
segregation, and forbids housing of prisoners with serious mental illness in segregation. Standard 23-2.9 governs
the process by which a decision is made to house a prisoner in long-term segregation. In Part III, Standard 233.7 and 23-3.8 limit the degree of sensory deprivation and
isolation even in such a setting, and Standard 23-3.9 deals
withi facility "lockdowns," which can somietimes operate,
de facto, as wholesale segregating reclassification. Finally,
Standard 23-6.11(c) and (d) repeat .2.8(a)'s rule against
housing prisoners with serious mentcal illness in antithierapeutic environments-which long-term segregation
cannot help but be-and require development, instead,
of high-security mental health housing appropriate for
those whose mental illness interferes with their appropriate functioning in general population.
PRISONS,

Reentry

America's prisons release over 700,000 people annually;
jails release millions more. The new Standards are imbued with the imperative that correctional administrators develop appropriate rehabilitative and vocational
programming for prisoners, help them maintain and reestablish connections to their families, ensure that they
have continuity of medical and mental health care, and
aiccess to housing, work, and trecatm-ent options upon
their release. Prisoners wvho successfulfly reenter the com-

Criminal Justice System, Report of the ABA Commis
sion on Effective Criminal Sanctions (2009), available
at http://www.abanet.org/cecs/secondchances.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2010).) For a summary of many recent
governmental initiatives in this area, see Re-Entry Policy
Council, http://www.reentrypolicy.org.
Part VIII of the Standards also covers the location
of facilities, prisoner work programs, visiting, access to
telephones, and fees and financial obligations. Standard
23-8.5, Visiting, is particularly noteworthy, and takes the
position that there are important public policy interests
served by encouraging prisoners to stay in touch with the
outside world, without regard to constitutional decisions
permitting limits on visiting. In support of this position
is a growing body of social science research showing that
retaining ties with family and community plays an im
portant part in reducing recidivism and facilitating reen
try. Visiting rights are also substantially protected under
international law.
Overall, the intent of these several provisions is to fo
cus the attention of those who operate and oversee jails
and prisons on the fact that nearly all of their prisoners
will be released, and to encourage policies and proce
dures that maximize the ability of all prisoners to remain
engaged with their families and to lead productive and
healthy lives upon their return to the community.
Conclusion
The American Bar Association has a proud history
of involvement in the development of the law govern
ing prisons and prisoners. In the years since the Attica
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riots, it has insisted that correctional administration be
bounded by legal requirements. And, it is fair to say that
the maturation of the field of corrections that has oc
curred since that time has been inextricably related to
the increased influence of legal norms behind bars. The
ABA is uniquely well positioned to take into account the
sometimes competing interests of prisoners, administra
tors, correctional officers, and the public. It should, ac
cordingly, remain a full partner in our polity's conversa
tion about prison conditions.
In the 1980s, the now-replaced Legal Status of Pris
oners Standards proved a useful source of insight and
guidance for courts and correctional administrators,
and were sometimes cited and used. This revision, long
overdue, recognizes the enormous changes that have af
fected American corrections since 1981, and deals with
many pressing current conditions and challenges facing
American corrections that have to date not been fully
addressed by the courts. To that extent, the goal of these
Standards is precisely "to shape the institutions of gov
ernment in such fashion as to comply with the laws and
the Constitution."
Justice Kennedy reminded us seven years ago of "the
inadequacies-and the injustices-in our prison and cor
rectional systems," and called the ABA back to the task
it first took up in the 1970s, of which these Standards are
only the most recent installment. As he recognized, the
bar has played and must continue to play a central role
in American corrections. Prisons and jails are, to their
core, legal institutions, and there is no place where it is
more important to defend liberty and pursue justice. ■
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